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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the efficiency of Italian airports. Analysing data on 
2010 trough conditional eﬃciency measures, we find that competition affects mostly the frontier of 
best performers, whilst airports that are lagging behind are less influenced by it. By applying a 
novel two stage approach, we show that competition has an inverse U-shape impact.  Finally, the bi-
modal shape of the distribution of pure efficiency indicates the existence of two differently managed 
groups of airports. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Deregulation of airlines, privatizations of airports and the recent phenomenon of low cost air 
transport have questioned the non-competitive nature of the airport business and the natural 
monopoly approach to airport regulation (Starkie, 2002): some contributions take the view that 
either regulation is no longer required or light-handed (or perhaps "shadow") regulation would 
suffice (Starkie, 2005), while the need of case-by-case analysis has been argued in other policy 
circles (Forsyth, 2007). Actually, the EU liberalization process – completed in 1997 – has formed a 
unique market where cabotage has been allowed (European Commission, 1992a,b,c): every 
European airline can provide a new route in the European network, i.e. a route having a European 
airport both as origin and destination. This has increased the available routes in the network and, 
therefore, the numbers of competing routes and competing airports. This is particularly true in the 
case of airports located in different metropolitan areas sharing - at least in part - the same catchment 
area (e.g. the case of major hub-and-spoke airports as Fiumicino in Rome and Malpensa in Milan, 
the airports of Barcelona and Madrid, Brussels and Amsterdam or Brussels and Paris). 
Nevertheless, even if they are located in the same metropolitan area and are managed by the same 
company (notably, Paris ADP airports, London BAA airports, Rome ADR airports, Milan SEA 
Airports), some competitive issues may arise due to possible cross-subsidies and the ensuing 
distortions (Oum and Fu, 2008).  
Running in parallel to the airline deregulation, many airports were involved into a privatization 
process, starting in Europe in 1987 with the privatization of the seven major British airports - 
including London Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted - sold to the British Airports Authority plc. 
(BAA)1.  Meanwhile, non-aeronautical revenues have been growing significantly to the point that 
they have become the main income source for many airports (Graham, 2009; Morrison, 2009)2: 
encouraged by the privatization process, has been also the commercialization of the airport industry. 
A positive influence of low-cost carriers’ (LCCs) activity on airport competition is even well 
researched (Dresner et al., 1996; Pels et al. 2009): an increasing number of small-medium 
                                                            
1 Following this example, the majority stakes of Copenhagen Kastrup International Airport, Vienna International 
Airport, Rome’s Leonardo Da Vinci Airport, and 49 per cent of Schiphol Airport, have been sold to private owners 
(Oum et al. 2004). In fact, more than 20 countries have completed the sale or lease of airport facilities so far. Some of 
them are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa and 
Switzerland (Forsyth et al. 2010). 
2 The global airport benchmarking study by the Air Transport Research Society (ATRS, 2011) reports that non-aviation 
revenues, most of which are concession revenues for Asian and European airports, accounted for 40 to 80 per cent of 
total revenues for 50 major airports around the world in 2010. 
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secondary and regional airports relies on the operations of LCCs which use a business model that 
has a relevant cost driver in airport costs and enables LCCs to shop around airports3. 
Finally, besides these institutional changes, other sources of increasing competition pressure, as the 
development of high-speed rails, interregional bus transportation and transport networks, have been 
constituting additional factors influencing competition between airports (OECD, 2009; Pavlyuk, 
2012). 
These changes, in turn, have led to a much more competitive outlook on the part of airport 
managers: airports, many of which have been treated in the past as public service organizations 
directly controlled by government administrations, have increasingly been restructured to attract 
private investments, search for new sources of revenues and attract the competing full service or 
low cost carriers (Starkie, 2002). In this scenario, it is essential for airport managers to improve 
daily operations and upgrade operational eﬃciency relative to other players in the market, 
enhancing their standing in a competitive environment (Forsyth et al. 2004). Moreover, it is crucial 
both for airport managers and the government to identify the best practices in a range of airport 
operations to provide the best services in the most efficient manner (Forsyth, 2003; Gitto and 
Mancuso, 2012). Efficiency benchmarking constitute, in this sense, a fundamental issue because of 
its implications for the operation of a competitive industry and the ensuing regulatory requirements. 
For these reasons, the impact of competition on airports efficiency is of increasing concern for 
airports management, policy makers and even municipalities, who require efficient airports for 
attracting businesses and tourists into a region (Scotti et al. 2012).  
In this paper we aim at assessing the impact of competition on airport efficiency, that is we aim at 
evaluating whether airports where the intensity of competition is higher are more efficient than 
those where it is lower. We focus on 35 Italian airports observed in 2010. Specifically, departing 
from previous studies on the Italian airport system (Abrate and Erbetta, 2010; Barros and Dieke, 
2007, 2008; Curi et al., 2010, 2011; Gitto and Mancuso, 2012; Malighetti et al., 2007; Scotti et al. 
2012), we use the recently introduced conditional eﬃciency measures (Daraio and Simar, 2005, 
2007a,b; Badin et al. 2012a) which have rapidly developed into a useful tool to explore the impact 
of exogenous factors on the performance of Decision Making Units (DMUs) in a nonparametric 
framework. This novel approach also provides a measure of ineﬃciency whitened from the main 
                                                            
3 However, their operations may be influenced by the availability of public funds (Francis et Al. 2003; Oum and Fu. 
2008). The European Commission has opened investigations on state aids possibly offered to LCCs by some airports 
such as Berlin Schoenefeld and Luebeck Blankensee in Germany, and Tampere Pirkkala in Finland. In a recent 
judgment, the Court of First Instance overturned the EC's decision that Ryanair received state aid through its contract 
with Charleroi airport. 
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eﬀect of the environmental factors, such as competition. This allows a ranking of units according to 
their pure eﬃciency, even when facing heterogeneous environmental conditions.  
Hence, the contribution of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we apply for the first time to the 
airport industry the recently developed conditional nonparametric approach to evaluate the impact 
of competition on efficiency. On the other hand, we provide new empirical evidence on the relation 
between competition and efficiency with respect to Italian airports. Indeed, to the best of our 
knowledge, Scotti et al. (2012) is the only study which investigates how the intensity of competition 
among Italian airports affects their technical efficiency. Using a parametric stochastic approach, 
they find that a negative impact of competition exists on technical efficiency of Italian airports. 
Thus, research on this issue still seems to lack maturity.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature addressing the evaluation of 
airport performance and efficiency. In Section 3 we present the data as well as the input and output 
variables used in the analysis. Section 4 describes the methodology applied while Section 5 
discusses the results. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature survey 
 
Airports efficiency is of increasing concern and source of debate for both academics and 
practitioners. There have been growing numbers of studies using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to benchmark airport efficiency (Adler et al. 2012; Arocena et Oliveros, 2012; Barros and 
Dieke, 2007, 2008; Curi et al., 2010,2011; Gillen and Lall, 1997, 2001; Fernandes and Pacheco, 
2002, 2003; Gitto and Mancuso, 2012; Malighetti et al., 2007; Sarkis, 2000; Suzuki et al., 2010; 
Wanke, 2012; Yu, 2010). Still others focus on stochastic frontier models (SFA) to analyze airport 
eﬃciency (Abrate and Erbetta, 2010; Barros, 2008a, 2008b; Martin-Cejas, 2002; Pels et al., 
2001,2003; Oum et al., 2008; Scotti et al., 2012). Other papers compare the DEA model with the 
SFA model (Hooper and Hensher, 1997; Pels et al., 2001, 2003).  
The Italian case has been investigated in the empirical literature. In particular, Barros and Dieke 
(2007,2008) applied a Simar and Wilson (2007) two stage procedure and find that hub, private and 
north parameters increase eﬃciency. Works by Malighetti et al. (2007) and Abrate and Erbetta 
(2010) extended the findings by Barros and Dieke and pointed out the existence of low levels of 
efficiency among Italian airports. Curi et al. (2010) by using a Simar and Wilson (2007) two-stage 
approach show that airports with a majority public holding are on average more efficient and the 
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presence of two hubs is source of inefficiency. A bootstrapped DEA procedure is used by Curi et al. 
(2011) to estimate technical efficiency of Italian airports and find that the airport dimension does 
not allow for operational efficiency advantages; on the other hand, it allows for financial efficiency 
advantages for the case of hubs and disadvantages for the case of the smallest airports. Moreover, 
the type(s) of concession agreement(s) might be considered as important source of technical 
efficiency differentials. Gitto and Mancuso (2012) find that a significant technological regress has 
been experienced and highlight the existence of a productivity gap between airports located in the 
North-central part of the country and those located in the South.  
In this framework, attention to empirical researches of competition as a factor affecting airport 
efficiency has not been sufficiently paid. Pavlyuk (2012) provides a critical review of different 
approaches to airport benchmarking, focusing on the relationship between spatial competition and 
efficiency of airports: despite the fact of a well-developed theory of spatial competition and signs of 
its growing effects in the airport industry, he finds a lack of studies devoted to this issue.  
Pavlyuk (2009) includes an index of competition based on overlapping catchment areas into a 
stochastic frontier model and finds a positive effect of competition pressure on efficiency for a 
sample of European airports. Pavlyuk (2010) extends the results with a multi-tier model of 
competition and the estimates provide both positive and negative effects depending on a distance 
tier. Adler and Liebert (2010) investigate the influence of competition on airport efficiency using a 
two stage DEA model. The level of competition is measured as the number of significant airports 
within a catchment area and it is found The find competition is a significant factor for results of 
different regulation forms.  
To the best of our knowledge, Scotti et al. (2012) is the only study which investigates how the 
intensity of competition affects the technical efficiency of Italian airports. They suggest an index of 
competition between two airports on the base of a share of population living in the overlapped 
region of the airports’ catchment areas. Competition is calculated separately for every destination 
point and combined into a general competition index using available seats shares as weights. 
Moreover, they use dummies regarding ownership and the degree of dominance of the main airline 
in a specific airport proxies for competition. Using a multi-output stochastic frontier analysis in a 
parametric framework, the authors find that the intensity of competition has a negative impact on 
airports’ efficiency from 2005 to 2008.  
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Departing from previous studies on the Italian airport system, this paper adds to literature as we use, 
for the first time, non parametric conditional eﬃciency measures (Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007a,b; 
Badin et al. 2012a) to evaluate the impact of competing factors on airports’ performance.  
 
3. Data 
The Italian system consists of 45 airports open to commercial aviation4 (ENAC, 2011). Rome 
Fiumicino (FCO) and Milan Malpensa (MPX) are the most important intercontinental hubs, where 
traffic exceeds, on average, 10 millions passengers per year. The remaining airports can be 
classified as medium sized airports, providing with further long haul and domestic routes, and 
regional airports providing a limited number of international and domestic connections.  
Management companies of airports open to commercial aviation hold, in many cases, a total 
concession agreement: the company gets all of the airport’s revenues for 40 years and is responsible 
for the infrastructure maintenance and development. This is the case of the hub airports, Rome 
Fiumicino or Milano Malpensa, and some other medium sized airports like Catania Fantanarossa or 
Napoli Capodichino. In some other cases, mainly for medium sized airports, management 
companies of airports hold a partial concession agreement, where the State collects revenues from 
runways and parking - and is responsible for their maintenance and development - while the airport 
management company gets revenues from infrastructures involving passenger and freight terminals. 
This is the case of airports such as Brescia Montichiari, Trapani or Treviso. Finally, in some cases, 
mainly for regional airports like Cuneo Levaldigi or Lamezia T. Sant’Eufemia, a precaria 
concession agreement is hold by the airport companies, who manage only the passenger and freight 
terminals, receiving only the revenue that is related to commercial activities inside the terminals.  
Data related to passengers traffic show a robust growth for Italian airports in 2010 - comparing to 
2009 - driven by good results at Rome Fiumicino and Milan Malpensa, in addition to the excellent 
results of several medium sized airports such as Bari (+20.3%), Bologna (+15.3%), Brindisi 
(+47.2%), Genoa (+13.3%), Lamezia Terme (+16.4%), Trapani (+57.4%) and Treviso (+21%) 
(ICCSAI FactBook, 2011). In many cases, the growth has been driven by low-cost airlines: with 
respect to previous years, the growth has been addressed in airports other than those which have 
historically supported  the development of low-cost carriers in Italy, such as Bergamo Orio al Serio, 
Pisa and Rome Ciampino. The analysis of traffic statistics with respect to some socio-economic 
indicators (Figure 1) shows that there is a great heterogeneity among Italian airports: passengers 
                                                            
4 The whole Italian system consists of 113 airports  - 11 exclusively open to military services and 102 to civil services.    
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traffic is concentrated in the North-Ovest part and in the Centre, where the most important 
intercontinental hubs are located but differentiations arise when looking at the number of 
passengers per inhabitant, per GDP or per firm located in the area. 
 
= = Insert Figure 1= = 
 
Preliminary considerations about the level of competition among Italian airports arise analyzing the 
percentage of competing Available Seats Kilometers (ASKs) and the share of competing routes 
(ICCSAI Factbook, 2011). The former represents the number of ASKs - related to the airport’s total 
offer - for which there is an alternative route serving any airport in the destination catchment area, 
either in terms of same destination airport or in terms of same destination area, served by an 
alternative airport. The latter considers airport routes for which at least one alternative route exists 
in the airport’s catchment areas - within 100 km of the departure or arrival airport. This number is 
expressed as a fraction of the total number of routes offered between the departure catchment area 
and the destination catchment area, including any offers of alternative airports that lie entirely 
within these areas. 
Figures 2 shows data relating to the biggest 35 Italian airports in 2010: the share of competing 
routes exceeds 60% in the case of Roma Fiumicino, Venezia Marco Polo, Bologna Marco Polo, 
among others, and 90% in the case of Catania Fontanarossa or Cagliari Elmas. 
 
= = Insert Figure 2 = = 
 
The model for Italian airports is estimated using annual data on 35 airports for 2010, consisting of 
16 airports located in the northern part of Italy, 7 in the centre and 12 in the southern part including 
islands. Small airports have been excluded due to the lack of economic data. Table 1 shows the 
characteristic of the airports included in the sample, with respect to the type of concession and the 
total offer in terms of passengers, amount of cargo and movements. 
 
= = Insert Table 1 = = 
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Traffic and technical airside informations have been collected from ENAC and balance sheets of 
airport management companies. The data have been integrated with some statistics on direct and 
indirect competition provided by ICCSAI - International Center for Competitive Studies in the 
Aviation Industry.  
We consider some physical inputs and outputs according to the current literature: Table 2 presents 
inputs and outputs analysed in selected previous studies.  
 
= = Insert Table 2 = = 
 
Input variables used in this paper includes: airport area (m2), number of runways, total runway area 
(m2), number of passenger terminals, total terminal area (m2), terminal area dedicated to passengers 
(m2), terminal area dedicated to concession activities (m2), number of gates and number of check-in 
counters. With respect to the outputs, three variables have been collected: number of passengers, 
amount of cargo (tons) and the number of aircraft movements.  
In addition, we include in the analysis a competition factor built on some conditional variables 
calculated as competition indices provided by ICCSAI (ICCSAI Factbook, 2011): the percentage of 
European GDP in a 100 km range, the percentage of European GDP accessible in one step, the 
percentage of European population accessible in one step, the inverse average number of steps 
necessary to reach any European airport, the inverse average number of steps necessary to reach any 
European airport worldwide, the number of airports in the catchment area, the percentage of 
competing ASKs and the share of routes in competition. 
Table 3 summarizes and defines all the variables used in this paper, while Table 4 provides some 
descriptive statistics. 
 
= = Insert Table 3 = = 
= = Insert Table 4 = = 
 
 
4. Methodology 
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Whitin the nonparametric literature, Data Envelopment Analysis  (DEA) has been widely applied 
for efficiency estimation and benchmarking5. In this framework, explaining inefficiency by looking 
for external or environmental factors has gained an increasing attention in recent frontier analysis 
studies.  
The performance of economic producers is often affected by external or environmental factors that 
may influence the production process - being responsible for differences in the performances of the 
Decision Making Units (DMUs) - but, unlike the inputs and the outputs, are not under the control of 
production units: quality indicators, regulatory constraints, type of environment (competitive versus 
monopolistic), type of ownership (private-public or domestic-foreign), environmental factors 
(conditions of the environment) and so on. Generally speaking, these factors can be included in the 
model as exogenous variables and can help explaining the efficiency differentials, as well as 
improving pure policy of the evaluated units. 
Generally speaking, the nonparametric literature on this topic has been focused on three main 
approaches: the one-stage approach, the two-stage approach (including the semi-parametric 
bootstrap-based approach) and the conditional nonparametric approach.  
The one-stage approach includes in the model the external factors either as freely disposable inputs 
or as undesired freely available outputs. The external variables are involved in defining the 
attainable set, but without being active in the optimization for the estimation of efficiency scores.  
In the two-stage approach, the nonparametric efficiency estimates obtained in a first stage are 
regressed in a second stage on covariates interpreted as environmental variables. Most studies using 
this approach employed in the second stage estimation either tobit regression or ordinary least 
squares6.  
                                                            
5 Some recent benchmarking references with respect to different industries include Kao and Hung, 2008, Yu and Lin, 
2008 and Erbetta and Rappuoli, 2008. Badin et al. (2012b) offer a state of the art review of the contributions that have 
been proposed to include environmental variables in nonparametric and robust - to outliers - frontier models and to 
analyze and interpret the conditional efficiency scores, capturing their impact on the attainable set and/or on the 
distribution of the inefficiency scores. 
6 The traditional two-stage approach has some serious inconveniences. First, it relies on a separability condition 
between the input-output space and the space of the external factors, assuming that these factors have no influence on 
the attainable set, affecting only the probability of being more or less efficient, which may not hold in some situations. 
Second, the regression in the second stage relies on strong parametric assumptions (e.g., linear model and truncated 
normal error term). Moreover, the DEA estimates are by construction biased estimators of the true efficiency scores and 
they are serially correlated. Finally, the error term in the second stage is correlated with the regressors, making standard 
approaches to inference invalid. Simar and Wilson (2007) developed a semi-parametric bootstrap-based approach to 
overcome these problems and also proposed two bootstrap-based algorithms to obtain valid, accurate inference in this 
framework.  
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In the nonparametric conditional approach, conditional efficiency measures are defined and 
estimated nonparametrically. The traditional Debreu Farrell efficiency scores are defined in terms 
of a nonstandard conditional survival function, therefore smoothing procedures and the estimation 
of a bandwidth parameter are required7; the nonparametric estimators of conditional efficiency 
measures are further defined by a plug-in rule, providing conditional FDH estimators as in Daraio 
and Simar (2005) or conditional DEA estimators, as in Daraio and Simar (2007b). In what concerns 
the asymptotic properties of the nonparametric conditional estimators, Jeong et al. (2010) proved 
the asymptotic consistency and derived the limiting sampling distribution of the conditional 
efficiency estimators. Recently, Badin et al. (2012a) analyze further the conditional efficiency 
scores, showing that the external factors can affect the attainable set of the production process 
and/or may impact the distribution of the inefficiency scores. They propose a flexible regression of 
the conditional efficiencies on the explaining factors which allows to estimate the residuals that may 
be interpreted as pure efficiency. It represents a technical efficiency level purified from the impact 
of the external or environmental factors and, therefore, it allows a fare ranking of units even when 
facing heterogeneous conditions. 
In this paper, we apply DEA and conditional DEA (Daraio and Simar, 2007b), with variable returns 
to scale (VRS) in an output oriented framework, to assess the efficiency of Italian airports. After 
that, the analysis of conditional efficiency scores is carried out for the first time to the airport 
industry to assess the impact of competition on airport performance. 
 
4.1 Marginal and conditional efficiency measures: local and global analysis. 
Decisions Makings Units (DMUs) transform resources (inputs) into products or services (outputs), 
but esternal or environmental conditions may affect this process. Let X א Թା
௣  denote the vector of 
inputs, Y א Թା
௤  the vector of outputs and Z א Թ௥ the vector of environmental factors that may 
influence the process and the productivity patterns. 
The effect of Z on the production may either affect the range of achievable values for the couples 
(X,Y), including the shape of the boundaries of the attainable set, or it may only affect the 
distribution of the inefficiencies inside a set with boundaries not depending on Z (only the 
                                                            
7 See Badin et al. (2010) for more details on a data-driven method for selecting the optimal bandwidth parameters in 
this context. 
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probability of being more or less far from the efficient frontier may depend on Z), or it can affect 
both. Finally, the environmental factors Z may also be completely independent of (X,Y).  
Let consider a probability model that generates the variables ሺX, Y, Zሻ, where P is the support of the 
joint distribution of ሺX, Y, Zሻ.The conditional distribution of ሺX, Yሻ, given a particular value of Z, is 
described by  
ܪሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ ൌ Prob ሺX ൑ ݔ, Y ൒ ݕ|Z ൌ ݖሻ,                                                                                         (1) 
or any equivalent variation of it (the joint conditional density function or the joint conditional 
cumulative distribution function, etc.). The function ܪሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ is simply the probability for a DMU 
operating at level ሺݔ, ݕሻ to be dominated by DMUs facing the same environmental conditions Z, i.e. 
there exist DMUs that produce more outputs using less inputs with comparable levels of 
environmental variables. Given that ሺZ ൌ zሻ, the range of possible combinations of inputs x outputs, 
ߖ௭, is the support of ܪሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ: 
ߖ௭ ൌ ሼሺݔ, ݕሻ| ݔ can produce ݕ|Z ൌ ݖሽ.                                                                                            (2) 
ܪሺݔ, ݕሻ denotes the unconditional probability of being dominated, defined as: 
ܪሺݔ, ݕሻ ൌ ׬ ܪሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ ௓݂ሺݖሻdݖ௓ ,                                                                                                       (3) 
having support ߖ, that is the marginal (or unconditional) attainable set, i.e. which does not depend 
on Z,  defined as8: 
ߖ ൌ ሼሺݔ, ݕሻ| ݔ can produce ݕሽ ൌ ڂ ߖ௭௭א௓ .                                                                                     (4) 
As described in Daraio and Simar (2007a), the two measures ܪሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ and ܪሺݔ, ݕሻ allow us to 
define conditional and marginal efficiency scores that can be estimated by nonparametric methods. 
Accordingly, the comparison of the conditional and unconditional efficiency scores can be used to 
investigate the impact of ܼ on the production process.  
The literature on efficiency analysis proposes several ways for measuring the distance of a DMU 
operating at the level ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴൯ to the efficient boundary of the attainable set. Radial distances 
(Farrell, 1957) are the most popular ones and they can be input or output oriented. In particular, in 
this paper, we use the output orientation, that is we consider the maximal radial expansion of the 
                                                            
8 Remember that the joint support of the variables (X,Y,Z) is denoted by P. It is clear that, by construction, for all zאZ, 
Ψzك Ψ. If the separability condition holds, the support of (X,Y) is not dependent of Z, equivalently Ψz =Ψ for all zאZ. 
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outputs to reach the efficient boundary, given the level of the inputs. From Daraio and Simar 
(2005), we know that under the assumption of free disposability of the inputs and of the outputs, 
these measures can be characterized by an appropriate probability function ܪሺݔ, ݕሻ, as defined 
above. We have, for the Farrell output measure of efficiency, 
ߣ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴൯ ൌ sup൛ߣ ൐ 0|ܵ௒|௑ሺߣݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴ሻ ൐ 0ൟ,                                                                               (5)  
where ܵ௒|௑ሺߣݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴ሻ ൌ Probሺܻ ൒ ݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴ሻ ൌ ܪ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴൯ ܪ൫ݔ଴,0൯ൗ  is the (nonstandard) 
conditional survival function of ܻ, nonstandard because the condition is ܺ ൑ ݔ଴ and not ܺ ൌ ݔ଴. If 
the DMU is facing environmental factors ܼ ൌ ݖ଴, then Daraio and Simar (2005) define the 
conditional Farrell output measure of efficiency as: 
ߣ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴|ݖ଴൯ ൌ sup൛ߣ ൐ 0|൫ݔ଴,ߣݕ଴൯ א ߖ௭బൟ                                                                                      (6) 
                        ൌ sup൛ߣ ൐ 0|ܵ௒|௑,௓ሺߣݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴, ܼ ൌ ݖ଴ሻ ൐ 0ൟ                                                          (7) 
where ܵ௒|௑,௓ሺߣݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴, ܼ ൌ ݖ଴ሻ ൌ Probሺܻ ൒ ݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴, ܼ ൌ ݖ଴ሻ ൌ ܪ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴|ݖ଴൯ ܪ൫ݔ଴,0|ݖ଴൯ൗ  is 
the conditional survival function of ܻ, here we condition on ܺ ൑ ݔ଴ and ܼ ൌ ݖ଴. The individual 
efficiency scores ߣ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴൯ and ߣ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴|ݖ଴൯ have their usual interpretation: they measure the radial 
feasible proportionate increase of output a DMU operating at the level ሺݔ, ݕሻ should perform to 
reach the efficient boundary of ߖ and ߖ௭ respectively. In case the environmental factor ܼ has an 
effect on this boundary, the unconditional measure ߣ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴൯ suffers from a lack of economic 
sounding, because, facing the external conditions ݖ, this unit may not be able to reach the frontier of 
ߖ, that may be quite different from the relevant one that is of ߖ௭. So, the conditional measure is 
more appropriate to evaluate the effort a DMU must exert to be considered efficient. 
In order to provide robust measures of efficiencies - robust to extreme data points or outliers - we 
also apply partial frontiers and the resulting partial efficiency scores9: while full frontiers are useful 
to investigate the local effect of ܼ on the shift of the efficient frontier, the partial frontiers are useful 
to analyse the impact of ܼ on the distribution of inefficiencies. In this case, we adopt order-α 
quantile frontiers, as defined in Daouia and Simar (2007). For any ߙ א ሺ0,1ሿ the order-α output 
efficiency score is defined as: 
ߣఈ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴൯ ൌ sup൛ߣ ൐ 0|ܵ௒|௑ሺߣݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴ሻ ൐ 1 െ ߙൟ.                                                                     (8) 
                                                            
9 A survey and a detailed analysis on robust partial frontier models including, order-m and order-ߙ frontiers, can be 
found in Daraio and Simar (2007a). 
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Similarly, by conditioning on ܼ ൌ ݖ଴, the conditional order-α output efficiency score of ሺݔ଴, ݕ଴ሻ  is 
defined as: 
ߣఈ൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴|ݖ଴൯ ൌ sup൛ߣ ൐ 0|ܵ௒|௑,௓ሺߣݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴, ܼ ൌ ݖ଴ሻ ൐ 1 െ ߙൟ.                                                 (9) 
In this framework, a value of α ൌ 0.5, which corresponds to the median frontier, provides 
complementary information on the effect of ܼ on the distribution of the inefficiencies..  
Nonparametric estimators of the conditional and unconditional efficiency scores are easy to obtain. 
For a DMU operating at level ሺݔ଴, ݕ଴ሻ the estimation of the output efficiency score, i.e. λ෠൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴൯, is 
obtained, in the (Variable Return to Scale) VRS case, by solving the following linear program: 
max
ఊ,஛
λ 
ݏ. ݐ.   λݕ଴ ൑ ෍ ߛ௜ݕ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
         
            ݔ଴ ൒ ෍ ߛ௜ݔ௜           
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
           ෍ ߛ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൌ 1 
            λ ൐ 0, ߛ௜ ൒ 0 ׊݅ ൌ 1 … ݊                                                                                                          (10) 
Similarly we obtain the estimation of the output condtional efficiency score, i.e.,  
λ෠൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴|ݖ଴൯, which can be computed solving the linear program
10: 
max
ఊ,஛
λ 
ݏ. ݐ.   λݕ଴ ൑ ෍ ߛ௜ݕ௜
௜|௭ି௛ஸ௭೚ஸ௭ା௛
         
            ݔ଴ ൒ ෍ ߛ௜ݔ௜
௜|௭ି௛ஸ௭೚ஸ௭ା௛
 
           ෍ ߛ௜
௜|௭ି௛ஸ௭೚ஸ௭ା௛
ൌ 1 
            λ ൐ 0, ݄ ൐ 0, ߛ௜ ൒ 0 ׊݅ ൌ 1 … ݊                                                                                            (11) 
                                                            
10 Note that this provide a local convex attainable set, local in the sense of condtitional on the external factors. 
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The nonparametric partial frontier efficiency estimates are obtained by plugging the estimators S෠௒|௑ 
and S෠௒|௑,௓, i.e. S෠௒|௑ሺݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴ሻ and S෠௒|௑,௓ሺݕ଴|ܺ ൑ ݔ଴, ܼ ൌ ݖ଴ሻ, in the expressions (8) and (9) 
defining the partial efficiency measures. For further details, the reader is referred to Badin et al. 
(2012a) for details on all the formulae and their statistical properties. 
The local analysis of the individual ratios may also be of interest: the local effect of ܼ on the 
reachable frontier for a unit ሺݔ, ݕሻ can be measured independently of the inherent inefficiency of the 
unit ሺݔ, ݕሻ. Indeed, ܴைሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ ൌ ߣሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ ߣሺݔ, ݕሻ ൑ 1⁄  is the ratio of the radial distances of ሺݔ, ݕሻ 
to the two frontiers. The inherent level of inefficiency of the unit ሺݔ, ݕሻ has been cleaned off, in the 
following sense: 
ܴைሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ ൌ
ఒሺ௫,௬|௭ሻ
ఒሺ௫,௬ሻ
ൌ
ԡ௬ԡఒሺ௫,௬|௭ሻ
ԡ௬ԡఒሺ௫,௬ሻ
ൌ
ቛ௬ೣ
ങ,೥ቛ
ฮ௬ೣ
ങฮ
                                                                                     (12) 
where ԡݕԡ is the modulus (Euclidean norm) of y and ฮݕ௫డฮ and ฮݕ௫
డ,௭ฮ are the projections of ሺݔ, ݕሻ 
on the efficient frontiers (unconditional and conditional, respectively), along the ray y and 
orthogonally to x. Clearly ฮݕ௫డฮ and ฮݕ௫
డ,௭ฮ are both independent of the inherent inefficiency of the 
unit ሺݔ, ݕሻ. Hence, the ratio measures the shift of the frontier in the output direction, due to the 
particular value of z, along the ray y and for an input level x, whatever being the modulus of y. In 
the same fashion we calculate the ratios corresponding to partial score, e.g. 
ܴை,ఈሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ ൌ ߣఈሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ ߣఈሺݔ, ݕሻ ൑ 1⁄ .  
Consistent estimators of the ratios are directly obtained by plugging the nonparametric estimators of 
the efficiency derived as described earlier, i.e. λ෠൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴൯ and λ෠൫ݔ଴,ݕ଴|ݖ଴൯. So we have R෡ைሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ ൌ
λ෠ሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ λ෠ሺݔ, ݕሻ.⁄ 11 
 
4.2 Second-stage regression and pure efficiency 
The aim of this section is to estimate the pure efficiency of DMUs through a novel two stage 
approach, which allows to purify ߣሺݔ, ݕ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ from the impact of ܼ. Indeed, ranking firms 
according to the conditional measures ߣሺݔ, ݕ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ can always be done but it is unfair, because 
firms face different external conditions that may be easier (or harder) to handle to reach the frontier.  
                                                            
11 The reader is referred to Badin et al. (2012a) for further details.  
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To avoid this problem, we analyze the average behavior of ߣሺݔ, ݕ|ݖሻ as a function of ݖ, that is we 
want to capture the marginal effect of ܼ on the efficiency scores analyzing the expected value 
ॱሺߣሺܺ, ܻ|ܼሻ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ as a function of ݖ. Then, we use a flexible regression model defining ߤሺݖሻ ൌ
ॱሺߣሺܺ, ܻ|ܼሻ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ and the variance ߪଶሺݖሻ ൌ ॽሺߣሺܺ, ܻ|ܼሻ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ such that: 
ߣሺܺ, ܻ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ ൌ ߤሺݖሻ ൅ ߪሺݖሻߝ                                                                                                       (13) 
where ॱሺߝ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ ൌ 0 and ॽሺߝ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ ൌ 1. Whereas ߤሺݖሻ measures the average effect of ݖ on the 
efficiency, ߪሺݖሻ provides additional information on the dispersion of the efficiency distribution as a 
function of ݖ. Several flexible nonparametric estimators of ߤሺݖሻ and ߪሺݖሻ could be applied; the 
reader is referred to Badin et al. (2012a) for more details. 
Analyzing the residuals, for a particular given unit ሺݔ, ݕ, ݖሻ, we can define the error term ߝ as: 
ߝ ൌ ఒ
ሺ௫,௬|௭ሻିఓሺ௭ሻ
ఙሺ௭ሻ
                                                                                                                                (14) 
It can be viewed as the part of the conditional efficiency score not explained by ܼ. If ߝ and ܼ do not 
show a strong correlation, this quantity can be interpreted as a pure efficiency measure of the unit 
ሺݔ, ݕሻ. If ߝ and ܼ show some correlation, still the quantity defined in (14) can be used as a proxy for 
measuring the pure efficiency, since it is the remaining part of the conditional efficiency after 
removing the location and scale effect due to ܼ. Then, ߝ can be used as a measure of  pure 
efficiency because it depends only upon the managers’ ability and not upon the external factors (ܼሻ. 
Indeed, this approach allows us to purify the conditional efficiency scores from the effects of ܼ. In 
this way, we are able to compare and rank heterogeneous firms among them because the main 
effects of the environmental conditions have been eliminated. In particular, a large value of ߝ 
indicates a unit which has poor performance, even after eliminating the main effect of the 
environmental factors. A small value, on the contrary, indicates very good managerial performance 
of the firm ሺݔ, ݕ, ݖሻ. Extreme (unexpected) values of ߝ would also warn for potential outliers.  
 
 
5. Results 
DEA and conditional DEA with variable returns to scale (VRS) are applied in an output oriented 
framework. The model for Italian airports is estimated using annual data on 35 airports for 2010. As 
described in Section 3, Table 4 summarizes and defines all the variables used in this paper while 
Table 5 provides some descriptive statistics. We then perform a local analysis of competition on 
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technical efficiency of Italian airports and a local linear regression of the conditional efficiencies 
scores on the competition factor which allows us to estimate the residuals. 
 
5.1. Factors on inputs, outputs and competition variables 
Due the dimensionality of the problem (9 inputs, 3 outputs, and 8 environmental factors) with the 
limited sample used here (35 units), we first reduce the dimension in the input × output × 
environmental factors space by using the methodology suggested in Daraio and Simar (2007a). In 
particular, we divide each input by its mean (to be “unit” free) and replace the 9 scaled inputs by 
their best (non-centered) linear combination, defined as ܫܨ, i.e. Inputs Factor. By doing so, we 
check that: (i) we did not lose much information; and (ii) the resulting univariate input factor is 
highly correlated with the 9 original inputs. We follow the same procedure with the 3 outputs and 
the 8 environmental factors. The results are: 
ܫܨ ൌ 0,31ݔଵ ൅ 0,49ݔଶ ൅ 0,36ݔଷ ൅ 0,51ݔସ ൅ 0,23ݔହ ൅ 0,23ݔ଺ ൅ 0,23ݔ଻ ൅ 0,26ݔ଼ ൅ 0,29ݔଽ    (15) 
ܱܨ ൌ 0,6ݕଵ ൅ 0,47ݕଶ ൅ 0,64ݕଷ                                                                                                      (16) 
ܥܨ ൌ 0,08ݖଵ ൅ 0,12ݖଶ ൅ 0,11ݖଷ ൅ 0,07ݖସ ൅ 0,09ݖହ ൅ 0,07ݖ଺ ൅ 0,62ݖ଻ ൅ 0,75ݖ଼                     (17)  
where ܱܨ and ܥܨ stand, respectively, for Outputs Factor and Competition Factor. ܫܨ explains 
88.7% of total inertia of original data, ܱܨ explains 88.9% of total inertia of original data, while ܥܨ 
explains 98.1% of total inertia of original data. To be consistent with previous notation we use, in 
what follows, ܺ, ܻ and ܼ instead of ܫܨ, ܱܨ and ܥܨ respectively. 
 
5.2. Local analysis of competition on technical efficiency of Italian airports 
We are here in an output oriented framework. As stated in Section 4.1, the full frontier ratios 
෠ܴைሺݔ௜, ݕ௜|ݖ௜ሻ are useful to investigate the local effect of competition on the shift of the efficient 
frontier, whilst the partial frontier ratios, ෠ܴை,ఈሺݔ௜, ݕ௜|ݖ௜ሻ, with ߙ ൌ 0,5 (corresponding to the 
median)12, are useful to analyse the impact of competition on the distribution of inefficiencies. 
                                                            
12 We computed also the partial frontier ratios with ߙ ൌ 0,95 to check if some outliers might mask the impact of Z, 
and found that even if there are some extreme points they do not affect the detection of the impact of Z. 
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Figure 3 illustrates a three dimensional plot of the full frontier ratios against inputs and competition, 
i.e. ܺ and ܼ, whilst Figure 4 shows a three dimensional plot of the partial frontier ratios against ܺ 
and ܼ.  
 
= = Insert Figure 3 = = 
= = Insert Figure 4 = = 
 
Without being able to rotate the three-dimensional figures, we have an idea of what happens 
complementing Figures 3 and 4 with their two marginal views. Figure 5 shows the ratios 
෠ܴைሺݔ௜, ݕ௜|ݖ௜ሻ as a function of the input (top panel) and the competition factor (bottom panel) 
respectively, that is they show the marginal effect of inputs and of competition on the efficient full 
frontier. Similarly, Figure 6 shows the ratios ෠ܴை,ఈሺݔ௜, ݕ௜|ݖ௜ሻ as a function of ܺ and ܼ respectively, 
that is they show the marginal effect of the input (top panel) and competition factor (bottom panel) 
on the distribution of inefficiency with respect to the median frontier.  
 
= = Insert Figure 5 = = 
= = Insert Figure 6 = = 
 
By inspecting the three dimensional plots (see Figures 3 and 4), it can be easily seen that the input 
factor does not play any role on the full frontier levels nor on the partial frontier levels. This is also 
confirmed looking at the marginal effects (see top panels of Figures 5 and 6).  On the contrary, the 
competition factor ܼ has a positive impact on the full frontier ratios, i.e. there is an increasing 
pattern of the full frontier ratios with increasing competition factor ܥܨ (see Figure 5, bottom panel). 
The impact is much less severe – but still positive - on the partial frontier ratios and so on the 
distribution of inefficiency scores (see Figure 6, bottom panel). 
 
5.3. Second stage analysis on the conditional efficiency scores 
According to the procedure described in Section 4.2, we regress the conditional efficiency scores 
against the Competition Factor, ܥܨ. We only remind here that the nonparametric model is 
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ߣሺܺ, ܻ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ ൌ ߤሺݖሻ ൅ ߪሺݖሻߝ, where ߤሺݖሻ characterizes the average behavior of the conditional 
efficiency as a function of ݖ, and  ߪሺݖሻ allows some heteroskedasticity. The residual ߝ is supposed 
to be not correlated with ܼ and so can be interpreted as a whitened version of the conditional 
efficiency where the influence of ܼ has been eliminated from ߣሺܺ, ܻ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ.  
Figure 7 illustrates the results for the full-conditional efficiencies estimates as a function of ܼ.13 We 
find that there is a local variable effect of competition (ܼ) on the average conditional scores. In 
particular,  it appears that competition has firstly a positive effect and after that a negative effect on 
ߣመሺܺ, ܻ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ, showing an inverse U-shape effect on the technical efficiency of Italian airports.  
 
= = Insert Figure 7 = = 
 
The result is emphasized in Figure 8, that presents a zoom of Figure 7.  
 
= = Insert Figure 8 = = 
 
Finally, Figure 9 shows a kernel nonparametric density distribution of estimated pure efficiencies of 
Italian airports, ߝ௜̂. These ߝ௜̂ represent pure efficiencies and have been computed eliminating the 
impact of the competing factor ܼ from the conditional efficiency score. Thus, it allows us to 
compare the performance of airports, facing different competing environments, on the base of their 
pure attitude without the influence of the competition environment faced. Interestingly, we observe 
a bi-modal distribution of the pure efficiency of Italian airports and a special attention should be 
devoted to investigate on its generating process14. 
 
= = Insert Figure 9 = = 
 
                                                            
13 The analysis has been done in logs but we obtained a similar shape for the picture in original units. 
14 This is beyond  the scope of this work. 
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It has to be noted that the impact of competition on the conditional efficiency scores has been nicely 
whitened: the Pearson correlation between ݖ௜ and ߝ௜̂ is -0.04 and the Spearman rank correlation is -
0.05. Hence, the ranking of Italian airports according to ߝ௜̂, reported in Table 5, is cleaned from the 
effect of competition.  
 
= = Insert Table 5 = = 
 
From a managerial point of view, the results reported in Table 5 are of great interest. CondEff is 
ߣመሺܺ, ܻ|ܼ ൌ ݖሻ, while PureEff  is ߝ௜̂. When the conditional efficiency score, CondEff, is one the 
airport is efficient given its level of competition; if it is higher than one, the airport could increase 
its outputs production given the inputs used and the competition environment faced. On the other 
hand, as the pure efficiency score, PureEff, increases, the airport decreases its performance, even 
after eliminating the main effects of competition. This depends only upon the managers’ ability, 
since it is the remaining part of the conditional efficiency after removing the location and scale 
impact of competition.  
Table 6 shows some descriptive statistics on CondEff and PureEff, according to three characteristics 
of interest that are the effect of localization, type of concession agreement and size.  
Strikingly, it appears that the airports located in the South present, on average, the best results in 
terms of efficiency when taking into account their level of competition. On the contrary, those 
located in the Centre present the worst results. This means that southern airports have an higher 
level of technical efficiency since, once purified from the effect of competition, they are able to 
combine their inputs (see Table 3) to obtain a higher level of outputs in terms of passengers, cargo 
and movements. A suggested interpretation could be that less favorable infrastructure and socio-
economic conditions stimulate airport management to try to maximize their technical efficiency.  
 
== Insert Table 6 == 
 
Moreover, big airports (>5 millions of passengers), such as Catania Fontanarossa, Bergamo Orio al 
Serio, Roma Fiumicino or Milano Linate, seem to be more efficient given their level of competition. 
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On the contrary, small airports (<1 millions of passengers) tend to show the worst performance. 
However, the relation between size and efficiency, on average, is not monotone. In facts, small-
medium airports (1< millions of passengers <3) appear to be more efficient that medium-high 
airports (3< millions of passengers <5) once purified by the level of competition. A suggested 
interpretation could be that small-medium facilities, such as Olbia Costa Smeralda, Alghero Fertilia 
or Trapani Birgi, have a touristic vocation so that a deeper specialization might imply higher 
technical efficiency.     
A total concession agreement also seems to produce a significant increase in airport productivity. 
This may be due to the fact that in the case of total concession agreement the service provider  - 
which is often a privatized company, as ADR in the case of Rome Fiumicino and Roma Ciampino, 
or SEA in the case of Milano Malpensa and Milano Linate - is responsible for managing the entire 
airport system. As a consequence, in the vast majority of cases this has implied an increase in 
investments and a more efficient utilization of the inputs, in order to fully exploit the benefit of 
liberalization. Interestingly, Catania Fontanarossa, which shows the highest ranking in term of pure 
efficiency, turned out to a total concession agreement in 2007. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the efficiency of Italian airports. We apply for the 
first time to the airport industry the recently developed conditional nonparametric approach to 
analyze the relationship between competition and technical efficiency. In addition, the methodology 
adopted allows us to obtain a proxy for measuring the managerial efficiency of airports. Indeed, the 
measure of pure efficiency depends only upon the managers’ ability and not upon the competition 
faced, since we are able to whiten the conditional efficiency scores. In this way, it is possible to 
compare airports between them and to rank those facing different environmental conditions, 
because the main effects of these factors have been eliminated. This is certainly one of the most 
important contributions of the paper with respect to previous literature. 
In particular, we disentangle the impact of competition on the efficient frontier and on the 
distribution of inefficiency scores. We find that competition affects mostly the efficient frontier, 
whilst airports that are lagging behind are less affected by it. From the two-stage analysis, we 
observe that on average the impact of competition on the technical efficiency is firstly positive and, 
after a certain threshold, it becomes negative, confirming that competition has an inverse U-shape 
impact on technical efficiency. Moreover, when computing the pure efficiency, we find that the 
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distribution of Italian airports has a bi-modal shape, pointing out on two groups of differently 
managed airports.  
Our findings show that airports located in the South present, on average, the best results in terms of 
efficiency when taking into account their level of competition. On the contrary, those located in the 
Centre present the worst results. A suggested interpretation could be that less favorable 
infrastructure and socio-economic conditions stimulate airport management to further improve their 
technical efficiency. Moreover, total concession agreements seem to produce a significant increase 
in airport productivity. This may be due to the fact that the airport management company is often 
privatized and, as a consequence, this has implied an increase in investments and a more efficient 
utilization of their resources. Lastly, big airports seem to be more efficient given their level of 
competition. On the contrary, small airports tend to show the worst performance. However, the 
relation between size and efficiency, on average, is not monotone. A suggested interpretation could 
be that small-medium facilities have a touristic vocation so that a deeper specialization might imply 
higher technical efficiency. This consideration leads us to put forward a conjecture: the effect of 
size on technical efficiency could be mediated by airport specialization. However, a deeper 
investigation of this issue is out of the scope of this paper and is left for further developments.   
Finally, airports located in the same metropolitan area or managed by the same company show 
some remarkable evidence. ADR owned Rome Ciampino appears to be more efficient, given the 
level of competition faced, than Rome Fiumicino, managed by the same company. Similarly, 
Bergamo Orio al Serio is more efficient than Milano Linate. This can be explained looking at many 
regional airports which have increased their traffic by attracting new airlines, and especially LCCs 
obtaining a higher utilization of their assets. In the cited examples, data on LCCs dominance, in 
terms of percentage of ASKs provided, reach 100% in the case of Rome Ciampino ( 21,7% in the 
case of Rome Fiumicino) and 95,4% in the case of Bergamo Orio al Serio ( 5,1% in the case of 
Milano Linate) (ICCSAI Factbook, 2011). This may suggest the opportunity of inducing small 
airport specialization within the same territorial system. Consequently, it would be interesting to 
investigate the impact of low cost carriers’ dominance and size on technical efficiency of airports 
and further developments of the work might go along this direction.  
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Figure 1 
 
Disaggregation by geographical area of passenger traffic, population, GDP and passengers 
per firm in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Our elaborations on data provided by ENAC – Ente Nazionale Aviazione Civile (National Civil Aviation 
Authority). 
a Percentage per geographic area  
b Index number Italy=100 
North-Ovest North-East North-Centre Centre South Islands 
Passengers 
Traffica 29.8 9.6 8.9 30.2 8.3 13.2 
Populationa 25.8 12.5 14.8 14.8 20.9 11.2 
GDPa 30.9 14.5 16.8 15.9 13.5 7.7 
Pax/Firmb 26.9 18.2 13.7 59.6 10.9 35.1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of competing ASKs and routes. Source: our elaboration on data from ICCSAI - 
International Center for Competitive Studies in the aviation industry. 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 3. Full frontier ratios against Input Factor (X) and Competition Factor (Z) 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4. Partial frontier ratios against Input Factor (X) and Competition Factor (Z). (ࢻ ൌ ૙. ૞, i.e. median 
of the distribution of efficiencies) 
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Figure 5 
 
Figure 5. Marginal effect of X and Competition Factor (Z) on the full efficient frontier. 
 
Figure 6 
 
Figure 6. Marginal effect of X and Competition Factor (Z) on the distribution of inefficiency (ࢻ ൌ ૙. ૞, i.e. 
median of the distribution of efficiencies) 
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Figure 7 
 
 
Figure 7. Effect of competition index (Z) on conditional efficiencies. 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
Figure 8.  Effect of Competition Index (Z) on conditional efficiencies: zoom to highlight the inverse U-shape 
effect of Z. 
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
2nd-stage regression
Z values
Lo
g 
C
on
di
tio
na
l E
ffi
ci
en
ci
es
 
 
μ(z)
σ(z)
data points
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2nd-stage regression
Z values
Lo
g 
C
on
di
tio
na
l E
ffi
ci
en
ci
es
 
 
μ(z)
σ(z)
data points
33 
 
Figure  9
 
Figure 9. Nonparametric density of estimated pure efficiencies of Italian airports (year 2010). 
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List of Tables 
Table 1 
Characteristics of Italian airports included in the sample, with respect to traffic, amount of 
cargo and number of movements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on data provided by ICCSAI – International Center for Competitive Studies in the 
Aviation Industry. 
  
Total Passengers Amount of cargo 
(tons) 
Number of movements 
Total Concession   
4259197.56 34066.61 50775.22 
 
Partial Concession   
1665773.25 2918.38 19515.38 
Precaria Concession   
370958.44 702.67 7256.44 
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Table 2   
Inputs and outputs used in previous literature 
Selected previous studies Input Output 
Abrate and Erbetta (2010) Labour costs Number of passengers  
 Soft cost Handling revenues 
 Runway lenght Commercial revenues  
 Apron size 
 Total airport area 
Barros and Dieke (2007) Labour costs Number of planes  
 Operational costs excluding labour 
costs 
Number of passengers 
 Capital invested Commercial sales 
 Amount of cargo 
 Aeronautical sales 
 Handling receipts  
Barros and Dieke (2008) Labour costs Number of planes  
 Operational costs excluding labour 
costs 
Number of passengers 
 Capital invested Commercial sales 
 Amount of cargo 
 Aeronautical sales 
 Handling receipts  
Curi et al. (2010) Labour costs Number of planes  
 Operational costs excluding labour 
costs 
Number of passengers 
 Capital invested Commercial sales 
 Amount of cargo 
 Aeronautical sales 
 Handling receipts  
Curi et al. (2011) Employees Number of movements 
 Apron size Number of passengers 
 Number of runway Amount of cargo 
Gitto and Mancuso (2012) Number of movements  Labor costs 
 Number of passengers Soft costs 
 Amount of cargo Capital invested 
 Aeronautical revenues 
 Non-aeronautical revenues 
Scotti et al. (2012) Runway capacity  Yearly numbers of aircraft movements 
 Number of aircraft parking positions Passengers movements  
 Terminal area Amount of cargo 
 Number of check-in desks 
 Number of baggage claims  
 Number of employees 
Wanke (2012) Airport area Number of landings and take-offs 
 Apron area Number of passengers 
 Number of runways Cargo throughput 
 Total runway length 
 Number of aircraft parking spaces 
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 Terminal Area 
 Number of parking places 
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Table 3  
List of inputs, outputs and competition variables. 
Variables Code Definition 
Inputs 
Airport area (m2) SED Total airport surface 
Number of runways NPI 
Number of runways dedicated to the landing and taking-off of 
planes 
Total runways area (m2) API Total runways surface 
Number of passenger terminals NTP Number of terminals excluding those dedicated to cargo 
handling 
Total terminal area (m2)  ATE Total terminal surface 
Terminal area for passengers (m2)  APA Share of terminal area dedicated to passengers movements 
Terminal area for concessions (m2) ACO Share of terminal area dedicated to concession activities 
Number of gates NGA Number of gates in all passengers terminals 
Number of check – in NCI Number of check-in counter desks in all passengers temrinals 
Outputs 
Number of passengers APM Number of passengers arriving or departing and passengers 
stopping temporarily 
Amount of cargo (tons) CAR Amount of cargo in tons 
Number of movements ATM Number of plans that lands and takes-off from the airport 
Competition variables 
% of EU GDP in a 100 km range PKM This indicator measures the GDP generated in all European 
administrative areas defined at the NUT3 level (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics: Local Areas) whose centers lie 
within 100 km of the airport, as a share of total European GDP. 
% of EU GDP accessible in one 
step 
PI1 The indicator measures the total GDP of NUT3 administrative 
areas whose centers lie within 100 km of any destination airport 
reachable by a non-stop route departing from the airport. 
% of EU population accessible in 
one step 
POP This indicator measures the total European resident population 
of NUT3 administrative areas whose centers lie within 100 km 
of any destination airport reachable by a non-stop route 
departing from the airport. 
1/ Average number of steps 
necessary to reach any European 
airport 
ISE For a given airport, this index expresses the inverse of the 
average number of flights necessary to reach any other European 
airport (considered separately even when serving the same area). 
1/ Average number of steps 
necessary to reach any airport 
worldwide 
ISM For a given airport, this index expresses the average number of 
flights necessary to reach any other airport worldwide 
(considered separately even when serving the same area). 
Airports in the catchment area ABU This is defined as the number of airports within 100 km as the 
crow flies from the airport in question 
% of ASK in competition ASK Number of ASK in an airport’s total offer for which there is an 
alternative route serving any airport in the destination catchment 
area (either in terms of same destination airport or in terms of 
same destination area, served by an alternative airport) 
Share of routes in competition QRC This indicator considers airport routes for which at least one 
alternative route exists in related catchment areas (within 100 km 
of the departure or arrival airport). This number is expressed as a 
fraction of the total number of routes offered between the 
departure catchment area and the destination catchment area, 
including any offers of alternative airports that lie entirely within 
these areas. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics on inputs, outputs and competition variables 
 
Variables Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Inputs   
SED 15,736,00 164,000 15,900,000 3,101,828.57 3,012,989.42 
NPI 3 1 4 1.37 0.65 
API 701,400 50,100 751,500 162,390.66 126,647.13 
NTP 3 1 4 1.11 0.53 
ATE 317,400 800 318,200 40,269.71 71,554.39 
APA 152,216 520 152,736 18,238.31 31,481.25 
ACO 47,592 138 47,730 5,369.77 9,619.75 
NGA 89 2 91 14.77 19.17 
NCI 428 2 430 44.29 82.58 
Outputs   
APM 36,275,264 62,259 36,337,523 3,899,824.14 6,725,579.64 
CAR 432,674 0 432,674 26,238.69 77,968.00 
ATM 326,362 2,907 329,269 44,670.43 62,283.49 
Conditional variables  
PKM 4,3 ,2 4.5 1.75 1.29 
PI1 88.30 1.80 90.10 44.84 23.79 
POP 90.70 1.70 92.40 41.69 23.89 
ABU 4 0 4 1.49 1.29 
ASK 100.0 0.00 100.00 50.78 34.19 
QRC 99.60 0.00 99.60 34.37 30.55 
ISE 0.17 0.34 0.51 0.41 0.04 
ISM 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.30 0.02 
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Table 5  
Conditional efficiency scores (CondEff) and Pure efficiency (PureEff) of Italian airports (year 
2010). 
DMU NAME PureEff CondEff 
OLB Olbia Costa Smeralda -0.806 1.000 
CTA Catania Fontanarossa -0.806 1.000 
LIN Milano Linate -0.805 1.000 
BGY Bergamo Orio al Serio -0.805 1.000 
FLR Firenze Peretola -0.803 1.000 
TSF Treviso -0.798 1.000 
CIA Roma Ciampino -0.796 1.000 
VBS Brescia Montichiari -0.790 1.000 
GOA Genova G. Colombo -0.790 1.000 
PSR Pescara Liberi -0.789 1.000 
BRI Bari Palese -0.789 1.000 
AOI Ancona Falconara -0.789 1.000 
PEG Perugia Sant'Egidio -0.788 1.000 
BLQ Bologna G. Marconi -0.778 1.000 
BZO Bolzano -0.761 1.000 
NAP Napoli Capodichino -0.732 1.034 
MXP Milano Malpensa -0.725 1.000 
VCE Venezia Marco Polo -0.723 1.000 
CUF Cuneo Levaldigi -0.698 1.000 
FCO Roma Fiumicino -0.580 1.000 
VRN Verona -0.104 1.362 
CAG Cagliari Elmas 0.004 1.465 
AHO Alghero Fertilia 0.658 2.022 
SUF Lamezia T. Sant'Eufemia 0.796 2.145 
TRS Trieste Ronchi dei Leg. 0.821 2.167 
TPS Trapani Birgi 0.887 2.259 
BDS Brindisi Casale 0.993 2.330 
PMO Palermo Punta Raisi 1.078 2.299 
REG Reggio Cal. Tito Menniti 1.140 2.348 
PSA Pisa Galilei 1.398 2.525 
TRN Torino 1.488 2.788 
FRL Forlì Luigi Ridolfi 1.891 3.679 
RMI Rimini Miramare 2.181 4.245 
CRV Crotone   N.A.* N.A. 
PMF Parma     N.A.** N.A. 
*only two points to estimate the conditional distribution function 
**only one point to estimate the conditional distribution function 
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Table 6  
Comparison with respect to localization, type of concession agreement and size of conditional 
efficiency scores (CondEff) and pure efficiency (PureEff) of Italian airports (year 2010, 
average value).  
 
 
Effect PureEff CondEff  
Effect of localization 
South -0.366 1.283 
North -0.093 1.616 
Centre 0.286 1.764 
Effect of concession agreement
Total -0.296 1.345 
Partial Precaria 0.055 1.597 
Partial 0.395 2.098 
Effect of size 
>5 millions -0.744 1.004 
1<millions<3 0.017 1.594 
3<millions<5 0.132 1.608 
< 1 million 0.264 1.930 
   
 
